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Abstract
Prompted by concordant upward trends in both the university advancement rate
and the unmarried rate for Japanese women, this paper investigates whether the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act (EEOA), which was passed in 1985, aected women's
marriage decisions either directly or via their decisions to pursue university education.
To this end, we estimate a model that treats education and marriage decisions as
jointly determined using longitudinal data for Japanese women. We nd strong support
for the proposition that the passage of the EEOA increased the deterrent eect of
university education on marriage, but only inconclusive evidence that the Act increased
the proportion of women with a university education.
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1 Introduction
The striking decline in Japanese birth rates over past thirty years has prompted national con-
cern, with fertility rates well below the population replacement rate (Faruqee and Muhleisen,
2001; Japan Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, 2015).1 The resulting shrinking pop-
ulation means that in the future, the country's old-age dependency ratio will increase as
the large postwar baby boom and baby boom echo cohorts are supported by subsequent,
smaller cohorts.2 Coincident with this decline in birth rates have been a decline in marriage
rates (Sakamoto and Kitamura, 2007) and a rise in the mean age of rst marriage (Japan
Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, 2015), both of which are linked directly by fertility
researchers to the decline in birth rates.3 Over the same period, with the passage of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act (EEOA) in 1985 and subsequent supporting legisla-
tion, career opportunities available to women have expanded, especially for women with a
university education.
The goal of this paper is to investigate the possible role the passage of the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Act in explaining the delay and decline in women's marriage, both
directly and through the link of higher education. Existing literature has documented the
increased proportion of women who get a university education over this period and sug-
gested that the EEOA may have played a role in this increase (Edwards and Pasquale, 2003;
Abe, 2011). At the same time, the large economic and demographic literature on the de-
terminants of women's marriage propensity and timing underscores the role of educational
attainment in marriage decisions, with university-educated women more likely than others
to delay marriage (e.g. Raymo, 2003). To our knowledge, only one paper (Abe, 2011) ad-
dresses the possibility that the passage of the EEOA could be a factor in women's marriage
decisions, but that paper does not explicitly test this proposition. In our paper, we address
this void by investigating whether the EEOA aected women's marriage decisions either
directly or via their decisions to pursue university education. Our model treats education
1 The total fertility rate reached its lowest point, at 1.26, in 2005 and though it has risen in 2014 to 1.42,
it is still well below the population replacement rate (Japan Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, 2015).
2 The ratio of those aged 65 and above to the working-age population (aged 20-64 years) is estimated to
rise from 27% in 2000 to 47% in 2025, higher than estimated for other low-birth-rate counties like France
and Italy (Faruqee and Muhleisen, 2001, Table 1).
3 As many researchers have noted (e.g. Hashimoto and Kondo, 2012), because the average number of
children borne by a married couple has stayed relatively constant since the 1970 and the percent of births
that take place outside of marriage is very small (less than 2% in 2003), it is the decline in the marriage rate
of women that accounts for the overall declines in fertility. See also Narayan and Peng (2007). For a general
review of models of marriage and childbirth, see Ermisch (2003) and Brien and Sheran (2003).
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and marriage decisions as jointly determined|something that has not been done in previous
research on Japanese women|and is estimated using data from the Japanese Panel Survey
on Consumers (JPSC).
Focusing on the likelihood that women marry by age 32, our research provides strong sup-
port for the proposition that the passage of the EEOA played a role in the delay and decline
of marriage. Specically, even when we take explicit account of the eect of unmeasured
personal attributes on education and marriage decisions, we nd that the deterrent eect
of university education on marriage more than doubles for post-EEOA cohorts of women
as compared to pre-EEOA cohorts. University-educated women in post-EEOA cohorts are
16 to 19 percentage points less likely than their less educated contemporaries to be married
by age 32, whereas for pre-EEOA cohorts the corresponding decline is at most 8 percentage
points. On the other hand, we nd that the decision to obtain a university education is
primarily determined by a young woman's ability and a host of family background char-
acteristics, with the EEOA having an ambiguous and at best small impact. Overall, our
ndings indicate that for those seeking to understand the declines over the past 30 years in
marriage and fertility in Japan, it is important to take into account the role played by the
EEOA.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we briey describe the Equal Employment
Act and review selected recent research on the relationships among education, marriage,
and the EEOA. In Section 3 we sketch out a model of joint decision making with regard
to education and marriage. Section 4 describes the JPSC data, followed by Sections 5
and 6, which provide estimates of our model using a recursive bivariate probit statistical
methodology. Section 7 summarizes our conclusions.
2 Background and Related Research
The trends that prompt our research and that of many others are illustrated in Figure 1.
Shown in this gure are data from 1970 to 2013 for the total fertility rate, the percent of
women aged 30-34 not married, the percent of female high school graduates who advance to
university, and, for comparison, the percent of male high school graduates who advance to
university. Throughout this period there has been a dramatic decline in the total fertility
rate which, while increasing slightly since its nadir in 2005, still remains well below the
replacement rate. At the same time, the percent of women aged 30-34 who remain unmarried
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Figure 1: Four-year University Advancement Rate, Unmarried Rate and Fertility Rate
Source: Basic School Survey (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology), Vital Statistics (Ministry of
Health, Labour and Welfare), Population Census (Ministry of Internal Aairs and Communications)
has steadily increased, from under 10% in 1970 to almost 35% in 2010.4 Roughly parallel
with this rise in the proportion unmarried is the increase in young women's advancement
rate to university, growing from under 10% in 1970 to over 45% in 2010. It is noticeable
that the slopes of both of the latter two growth curves become steeper after 1985, the year
in which the EEOA was enacted by the Japanese legislature. The advancement rate to
university of young men also increased over the entire period, though less uniformly than
that of women, but the dierence between the advancement rates of men and women shrinks
noticeably after 1985.
These concordant trends suggest the following set of hypotheses, which we investigate in
this paper: (1) The passage of the EEOA, by expanding career opportunities of university
educated women, increased the proportion of qualied women who follow this educational
path; (2) The expanded career opportunities associated with university education inuence
4 Young women's mean age at rst marriage has also been increasing over this period, from 24.2 in 1970,
to 28.8 in 2010, to 29.3 in 2013 (Japan Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, 2015).
3
women's marriage decisions, leading them to delay or decline marriage; (3) The passage of
the EEOA (and subsequent supporting legislation), which changed the legal and cultural
landscape to make a career path more socially and economically attractive to women, in-
creased the \deterrent" eect of university education on marriage.
To explore these hypotheses, we develop and estimate a multivariate model of the re-
lationship between Japanese women's education and marriage decisions and the role of the
EEOA in these decisions.5 While no other studies directly address this set of hypotheses, a
number of papers that examine some of the relevant relationships inform our research. They
are reviewed in the sub-sections below.6
2.1 The 1985 Equal Employment Opportunity Act and Subsequent Supporting
Legislation
The Equal Employment Opportunity Act (EEOA) was enacted in 1985 and went into eect
in April 1986. Prior to 1985, the primary Japanese legislation that treated women's position
in the labor market was the 1947 Labor Standards Law, which prohibited gender-based wage
discrimination. Japan, as a signatory of the 1980 United Nations Convention Concerning the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, sought to expand its legislation
with regard to women in the labor market in order to meet the commitments in this Con-
vention. The 1985 EEOA was the result: it prohibited gender discrimination with respect
to vocational training, fringe benets, dismissal, and mandatory retirement by reason of
marriage, pregnancy or childbirth. The Act also stated that rms have a \duty to endeavor"
to equalize opportunity with regard to recruitment, hiring, job assignment and promotion,
though there were no prohibitions in these important areas. The Japanese government pro-
vided administrative guidance to rms to help them meet this duty, but there was no private
right to legal action with regard to these areas of unequal treatment.7 Even with these
drawbacks, however, the EEOA of 1985 was enthusiastically welcomed by Japanese women
5 Models like the one we use in this paper owe a great debt to the seminal work of Gary Becker on human
capital, marriage, and the economics of the family (see, for example, Becker (1976, 1993)).
6 The next subsection relies heavily on Araki (1998), which provides a good review (in English) of the
1985 EEOA as well as the 1997 legislation (which went into eect in 1999) that substantially strengthen the
original law. Yamada (2013) also summarizes these two laws and provides a description of the subsequent
law, which further expands on the original EEOA. In earlier literature the EEOA was referred to as the
Equal Employment Opportunity Law, or EEOL, as opposed to the Equal Employment Opportunity Act,
but EEOA is a more apt translation of the Japanese title for this law. With regard to legislation covering
leaves for child and elder care, Japan Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (2010) is a good reference.
7 Government oversight in the form of \administrative guidance" is much more eective in the Japanese
context than it would be in an American context; indeed, some argue that it is a \means more eective than
criminal or civil sanctions in the Japanese social context" (Araki, 1998, p.5).
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as epoch-making legislation. Especially for university-educated women, it was expected to
expand labor market opportunities, making \career" positions more available to them in
an era when most women had been required by their employers to leave their jobs upon
marriage or childbirth regardless of their educational levels.
In order to strengthen the 1985 Act, the Japanese legislature revised it two times, in
1997 and 2003. The Amendment to EEOA of 1997 prohibited discrimination in hiring
and promotion, and the Amendment of 2003 prohibited discrimination against males. The
Amendment of 2003 also included a prohibition of implicit discrimination. This proscription
was introduced in response to the fact that after the original EEOA went into eect, many
larger rms adopted a dual-career path system to steer women away from traditional career
position (Hamaguchi, 2011). Other important legislation related to the EEOA is the 1991
Child Care and Family Care Leave Act, which was strengthened in 1995 and 1999. It
mandates that employers give parental leave to any mother whose child is under the age of
one.
2.2 The EEOA/Labor Market Link
The hypotheses we explore are based on the proposition that the EEOA expanded career
opportunities for university-educated women. Three recent papers, Abe (2010, 2011, 2013),
investigate this proposition by looking at eects of the EEOA on women's earnings and
employment.
Abe (2010) examines the impact of the EEOA on the gender wage gap using cohort
data from the Basic Survey of Wage Structure at ve-year intervals from 1975 to 2005.
Focusing on full-time workers only, she shows that while the overall female/male full-time
wage gap decreased over this period, this decrease was mainly attributable to an increase
in the educational attainment of the full-time female labor force; for university-educated
women, the female-to-male wage gap narrowed very little for post-EEOA cohorts.
The gender wage gap within educational categories may not have been much aected
by the EEOA, but what about women's employment? The relationship between the EEOA
and women's labor force behavior over the life cycle is the focus of Abe (2011). Using
data from the Japanese Employment Status Survey (ESS, Shugyo Kozo Kihon Chosa) from
1998 to 2007, this paper examines how the EEOA aected women's full- and part-time
employment patterns both by marital status and by level of educational attainment. Using
a methodology that compares cohorts of women who entered the labor market after the
EEOA went into eect with earlier, pre-EEOA, cohorts, Abe nds that the employment
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rate in full-time positions increased post-EEOA only for university graduates. Taking the
analysis further, Abe decomposed changes in full-time employment of this group by marital
status since unmarried women typically have higher employment rates than married women.
She nds that the full-time employment rate did not increase for either married or unmarried
university-educated women, but rather that the proportion of these highly educated women
who remained unmarried had increased.
Abe (2013) explores the possibility that the EEOA may have had dierent impacts across
the various Japanese regions and concludes that such dierences do exist: the post-EEOA
increase in employment rates of university-educated women documented in her earlier re-
search was most evident in the Tokyo area, most likely because that is where there is the
greatest availability of managerial positions.
Taken together, these three studies suggest that the benets to Japanese women of the
career opportunities enabled by the EEOA were to be obtained mainly by investing in univer-
sity education and working (especially in Tokyo) a full-time rather than part-time schedule,
the latter which was facilitated by delaying or declining marriage. Abe's ndings are based
on a model that does not allow for the explicit possibility that marriage rates and educa-
tional attainment are themselves aected by the EEOA, but she recognizes these links in
her conclusion: \Since the enactment of the EEOA, more women with university education
have married late or stayed unmarried" (Abe, 2011, p.52).
2.3 Higher Education and the EEOA
The role of the EEOA law in young women's decisions with regard to post-high-school
education is addressed in Edwards and Pasquale (2003). Using micro-data from the rst wave
of the Japanese Panel Survey on Consumers (JPSC), Edwards and Pasquale's analysis holds
constant family background, demographic factors, and economic conditions in estimating
the eect of the passage of the EEOA on the higher education decisions of young Japanese
women. Their model does a good job of explaining higher education decisions, but the results
with regard to the eect of the EEOA are not robust, in part because only two cohorts in
the survey had made educational decisions after the passage of the law. Nonetheless, their
research provides suggestive evidence that the passage of the law was associated with an
increased propensity of young women to choose university education over junior college.
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2.4 Marriage
There is an extensive economic and demographic literature on women's marriage rates in
Japan, much of it focusing on explaining the secular declines illustrated in Figure 1. To
our knowledge, none of this literature explicitly addresses the possible role of the EEOA in
contributing to this decline, but a variety of other explanations have been explored. Some
studies focus on the role of labor market conditions, including unemployment rates of men,
women, or both (e.g. Higuchi, 2001; Miyoshi, 2014; Hashimoto and Kondo, 2012). Other
studies focus on the role of the women's own earnings and income (e.g. Higuchi, 2001; Sakai,
2009). Still others focus on the increasing levels of women's educational attainment and the
resulting reduced relative availability of potential spouses with the requisite level of educa-
tion, dubbed the \marriage mismatch" hypothesis (e.g. Raymo, 2003; Raymo and Iwasawa,
2005). Other studies target increased income or other transfers (housing, for example) from
parents to daughters as a potential explanation|dubbed the \parasite single" hypothesis
(Sakamoto and Kitamura, 2007).
These studies examine dierent hypotheses and use dierent data sets, but they have one
common feature: all nd that a woman's educational attainment is an important correlate
of whether and when she marries. Specically, all of these studies report that women with
a university education are more likely to delay marriage.8 With regard to the question of
whether this delay translates into a lower overall likelihood that university-educated women
marry, the studies are not denitive. Results dier depending on the set of explanatory vari-
ables held constant in the analyses: for example, Raymo (2003) estimates a set of alternative
models which yield contrasting results on this point.
Other factors that have been found to be statistically signicant in one or more of these
various studies are: the woman's age; measures that represent various aspects of the labor
market for both men and women, including the woman's own income; measures that repre-
sent socioeconomic characteristics of her parents, including their income, health, and work
status; measures that reect income or other transfers from her parents, including housing;
characteristics of the woman's natal family; demographic measures that reect the availabil-
ity of potential spouses; and the region in which she lives and its rural/urban characteristics.
8 Even though university-educated women delay marriage while in school, they catch up to some extent
later|the dierence in mean age at marriage between university graduates and high school graduates is
substantially less than four years (see Shirahase, 2000, especially Table 1).
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3 A Model of Joint Education and Marriage Decisions
Pulling together the ndings cited above, we see that the EEOA is likely to have positively
aected the probability that women attend university; that university-educated women are
more likely than other women to be employed in full-time positions and to delay marriage;
and that a woman's decision to marry is empirically related to her level of education, her
family background, her earnings and income, and labor market conditions at the time of
her graduation and thereafter. The papers on marriage referenced above do not incorporate
the possibility that marriage and education are jointly determined; nor do they consider the
possibility that the EEOA might be related to marriage decisions. The model described
below incorporates these innovations.
3.1 The Japanese Context
Japanese women typically choose between two types of post-high school education|university
and junior college|but it is university education that provides the background for a career.9
Junior college curricula are typically limited and three-quarters of them \oer a single cur-
riculum in non-vocational subjects, such as music, home economics, and English literature"
(Ishida, 1998). Junior college education is likely to be better preparation for marriage than
for career employment, and the nancial returns from a junior college education may run
predominantly through the marriage market as compared to the labor market. University
education, in contrast, oers a curriculum that provides superior preparation for career em-
ployment, though it too may improve a young woman's marriage prospects.10 The education
decision we focus on, therefore, is the decision to attend or not attend university.
A distinguishing feature of Japanese higher education is that, unlike the United States
where people leave and re-enter post-high school educational institutions at various points
in life, education in Japan is more structured; few women are in any type of formal schooling
after marriage. In addition, the path to university education is well dened, so that without
proper preparation in the high school years, a Japanese student cannot expect to enter
9 Other post-high school options are colleges of technology and specialized training colleges, which provide
a wide variety of vocational and practical skills but are not typically considered to be comparable to university,
though in some cases they may be comparable to junior colleges.
10 In the context of the United States, Goldin (1992), Lefgren and McIntyre (2006), Ge (2011), and others
have shown that a large part of the returns to university education is via the marriage market: by attending
university, young women come in contact with highly educated young men who will have greater future
earning power. For example, doing a \back-of-the-envelope" computation, Lefgren and McIntyre estimate
that about half of the increase in a woman's \available income" (including income that she receives through
her marriage) associated with her own higher education comes through the marriage market.
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university.11 These features provide the setting within which education decisions are made
in Japan.
3.2 The Model
The model we sketch out below captures in stylized form this context and is similar in
spirit to the model outlined by Lefgren and McIntyre (2006) (hereafter referred to as L&M).
L&M posit a two-period model in which a woman's education decision is made in the rst
period and her marriage decision is made in the second period.12 They also postulate that a
woman's education does not directly aect her \draw" in the marriage market, but because
higher education is associated with higher earnings, her education does aect whether or
not a particular draw from the distribution of potential husbands will be acceptable to her.
The higher her own level of education, the fewer the number of men acceptable to her as a
potential spouse. In this model, the resulting relationship between educational attainment
and marriage can be positive or negative, depending on whether a woman's higher level
of education has a stronger eect on her own earnings or on her share of her husband's
earnings.13 L&M also show, as we will below, that a woman's educational choice is related to
her future marriage expectations and that not taking into account this potential endogeneity
can lead to biased coecients of the education variable in a marriage equation.
While our model is inspired by L&M, it diers because we focus on tracing the eects
of the EEOA on the interrelated decisions regarding education and marriage rather than on
measuring the economic status of women before and after marriage. We assume that a young
woman's (and her family's) decision with regard to whether or not she will get a university
education is well dened by the time she is near the end of high school|at age 17 (this age
corresponds to period one in L&M's model). Variables that aect this decision would include
11 This characterization of access to university education is appropriate at the time the women in this
sample were attending university, but more recently there have been changes. For example, in 1997 only 5%
of private universities fell below their enrollment limits, but by 2008 the situation had changed dramatically,
with 47% of private universities falling below their enrollment limits. As a result, more universities are now
enrolling students with lower test scores than would have been acceptable in the past; such universities have
been dubbed \free-pass" universities by the Japanese media. For a detailed discussion of recent changes in
Japanese higher education see Igami (2014).
12 L&M apply this two-period model to data for the United States, but the model is more appropriate in
the context of Japan than it is for the United States, where it is not at all uncommon for people to enter
and/or reenter university after marriage or after having had children.
13 Another paper that looks at the interrelationship between education and marriage decisions in the U. S.,
Ge (2011), focuses on the increased nancial gains from marriage obtainable by attending college (because
of the better set of potential spouses from which to choose) and reports that the expected nancial gains
from marriage are a signicant determinant of a woman's decision to attend college.
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family demographic and socioeconomic characteristic, the expected costs and returns to a
university education, and unmeasured ability and taste factors that reect a young woman's
desire for career employment and marriage. The marriage decision is assume to take place
after her education is completed (this corresponds to period 2 in the L&M model), and is
determined by the young woman's educational attainment (which, in line with L&M, will
aect her nancial returns to marriage), her family background, various indicators of the
states of the marriage and labor markets, and unmeasured taste and culture factors that
inuence both her career aspirations and her judgment about the desirability of marriage.
The features described above are best captured by a recursive bivariate probit statistical
model, represented mathematically below (see Greene, 2008, pp. 823-826 for a discussion of
this model). For i = 1; : : : ; N ,
Ei = 1 [eAi + xe;i
0e + "e;i > 0] (1)
Mi = 1 [Ei + mAi + (Ei  Ai) + xm;i0m + "m;i > 0] ; (2)
where 1 [] is an indicator function, and the error terms are assumed to be distributed as a















In this system of equations, the dichotomous variable Ei represents whether or not a young
woman i completed university,14 and Mi represents whether or not she has been married by
the age of 32.15 The factors which aect the education decision, denoted by xe, are similar
to those in Edwards and Pasquale (2003), while the error term "e picks up unmeasured
ability, tastes for education, taste for marriage, and taste for career employment, all as of
the time the young woman is making her higher education decision. The factors that aect
the marriage decision, denoted by xm, follow closely the marriage literature cited earlier,
while the random error term, "m, picks up various luck factors that determine a marriage
match and also the young woman's unobservable taste for career employment and marriage
14 Like L&M, we posit these relations in the form of regression equations. In an appendix, L&M sketch out
how regression equations such as these could be derived, with a set of appropriate simplifying assumptions,
from a utility maximization framework. Note also that the rst equation in the system is similar to the
estimating equation in Edwards and Pasquale (2003), which is derived from a random utility model.
15 In this paper, since we are focusing on the marriage decision, we dene our marriage variable to include
anyone who at the point when we observe her had decided to become married, whether or not that marriage
ended in divorce. Note that divorce is relatively rare in Japan, at about 2 per 1000 population in 2010 (Japan
Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, 2015). In the JPSC data, approximately 1.0% of the previously
married women get divorced every year.
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at the time of completing her education. The variables in xe and xm, which have some
common elements, are described in detail in the next section. The dichotomous variable Ai,
appearing in both equations, indicates whether or not a young woman's education decision
was made before or after the passage of the EEOA.
There are three other things to note about the econometric model. First, there is a po-
tential correlation between the error terms in the education and marriage equations ( 6= 0)
because they both include components that represent unmeasured tastes for marriage and
career employment. Such a correlation implies that educational attainment is an endoge-
nous variable in the marriage equation (Cov[M; "m] 6= 0). Indeed, including the education
variable, which is the dependent variable in the rst equation, in the marriage equation (2)
as an explanatory variable is what distinguishes this statistical model from a non-recursive
model. Greene (2008, page 823) notes, however, that in models such as this one, the endoge-
nous nature of education variable in marriage equation \can be ignored in formulating the
log-likelihood." Hence, we are able to treat the education variable Ei in marriage equation
(2) as if it were exogenous, by jointly estimating equations (1) and (2) and allowing for a
correlation, ; between the error terms .
Second, identication of the model requires some variable in the education equation (1)
be excluded from the marriage equation (2). Although in theory the bivariate probit model
is identied without the exclusion restrictions (Wilde, 2000), the performance of the model
without the exclusion restriction tends to be poor. The exclusion restrictions help estimate
the model more accurately. As shown in the next section, our model satises the exclusion
restrictions since some explanatory variables which are included in the education equation
(1) do not appear in the marriage equation (2).
Third, we include an interaction term between the education variable and the EEOA
variable, as explained below, in order to see if the eect of education on marriage changes
after the passage of the EEO Act.
4 Data and Variables
The data used to estimate our model come from a unique micro-level panel survey entitled
the Japanese Panel Survey of Consumers (JPSC), a nationwide longitudinal survey of young
Japanese women and their husbands sponsored by the Institute for Research on Household
Economics (Kakei Keizai Kenkyujo) in Japan. These data are especially suitable for our
study because they provide a rich set of information about women's family background,
education, and marriage. The rst wave (Wave A) of this survey was conducted in 1993 and
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Figure 2: The Number of the JPSC Respondents by Age in Each Year
included 1500 randomly selected women aged 24-34 in that year.16 Subsequent waves (B and
C) were added to the sample in 1997 and 2003: Wave B included 500 women aged between
24 and 27 years in 1997; and Wave C included 836 women aged between 24 and 29 years in
2003. As of 2008, there remained 1648 respondents aged between 29 and 49 in the JPSC.
The structure of the data set is illustrated in Figure 2. Each row in the gure corresponds
to a year and shows the number of women of each age for whom data are reported for that
year. For example, in 1993, the rst survey year of Wave A, there were 151 women aged 24,
161 aged 25, and so on, for a total of 1500 women aged 24 to 34 in that year. In the following
year, 1994, the women have aged one year and there is some attrition, so that there are no
women aged 24, 145 aged 25 (6 women from that age-cohort had dropped out of the survey
over the year), 146 aged 26, and so on, for a total of 1415 women aged 25 to 35 in that
year (total attrition was 85). Things continue in a similar fashion in 1995 and 1996. Wave
B begins in 1997, with a new group of 24 to 27 year-old women added to the survey, and
Wave C begins in 2003, with an additional group of women aged 24 to 29 added in that year.
The potential number of women for whom we would have family background and education
information|both of which come from the questionnaire administered in the initial survey
16 The survey originally contacted 3,623 randomly selected women in this age group, of whom 1500 were
ultimately selected to be in the rst wave of the panel. Demographic characteristics of these participants
were comparable to those of the same age group in the Population Census (Higuchi, 2001).
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year for each wave|is 2836. Because of missing observations for some of these variables, our
actual sample consists of 2598 women.
Looking at Figure 2 in a slightly dierent way, one can see that each column shows
the number of observations available for women of a specied age but at dierent points in
calendar time. For example, if one wanted to study women at age 32, there would be 122
of them observed in 1993, 124 observed in 1994, and so on, for a total of 1641 women in
the sample who responded to the survey at age 32. Also indicated in this gure is whether
women of a particular age in a particular year are members of the pre-EEOA cohort or the
post-EEOA cohort. The pre-EEOA cohort is dened to be women aged 18 or older in 1985,
the year that the EEO Act was passed; women in this cohort appear in the gure above the
dotted diagonal. The post-EEOA cohort of women is dened to be those who were aged 17
or younger in 1985; women in this cohort appear below the dotted diagonal.
Our choice of marriage variable|whether a woman is or has been married by age 32|
requires some explanation. Ideally, we would observe marital status at an older age because
not all women who plan to marry will in fact be married by age 32. However, given the
construction of the sample and sample attrition, the later the age at which we observe
marital status, the fewer observations will be available. Further, if we choose to observe
marital status at a later age, the balance between the pre-EEOA and post-EEOA samples is
reduced. Thus, our choice is a pragmatic one: by observing women at age 32, we will capture
a large proportion of marriages while still having a large enough sample size to address our
main hypotheses.17
Among our working sample of 2598, there are 2157 women for whom marital status at age
32 can be determined. The dierence between these two numbers is attributable primarily
to: (1) women who remained in the survey through 2008 but had not yet reached age 32
and had not yet married; and (2) women who had dropped out of the sample before age 32
and had not married prior to dropping out. The main dierences between the subsample
for which marital status is known and the full sample are: the women in the subsample are
more likely to be from pre-EEOA cohorts (the proportions are .579 versus .518) and less
likely to have a university education (the proportions ares .151 versus .169).
The variables used in our estimation are dened in Table 1. The variables that do not
come from the JPSC are measured at the level of the prefecture18 in which the young woman
17 The mean age at rst marriage for women in Japan over the time period covered in our data ranged
from 25.9 (in 1990) to 28.8 (in 2010) (Japan Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, 2015).
18 Prefectures in Japan are geographic units that are similar to states in the United States. One variable
in Table 1 is measured at the national level: the University/H.S. First Wage Ratio.
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Table 1: List of Variables
Time Point
Variable Name of Measurement Variable Description
Marital Statusa (M) Age of thirty-two Ever married, 1; never married, 0.
Completed Educationa (E) Initial survey yearf University and above, 1; junior college and below, 0.
EEOAa (A) | Those who were 17 or younger in 1985 (the year EEO Act was passed),
1; otherwise, 0
Trend (Cohort trend)a | Those who were born in 1959 (the oldest respondents) were coded at 1,
and so on up to those where were born in 1979 (the youngest respon-
dents), who were coded at 21.
Parent's Incomea Initial survey yearf Parent's Annual Income in the previous year
High Income Class above 10 million, 1; otherwise, 0.
Middle Income Class between 2.5 million and 10 million yen, 1; otherwise, 0.
Low Income Class (Reference) below 2.5 million yen, 1; otherwise, 0.
Mother's Educationa Initial survey yearf University, 1; otherwise, 0.
Father's Educationa Initial survey yearf University, 1; otherwise, 0.
Private High Schoola Initial survey yearf Attended private high school, 1; otherwise, 0.
Homemakera Initial survey yearf During daughter's childhood (birth to age 20), mother was never em-
ployed for pay, 1; mother was at some point employed for pay, 0.
Number of Siblingsa Initial survey yearf Number of siblings
Having Brother(s)a Initial survey yearf Has one or more brothers, 1; otherwise, 0.
Juku 2a Initial survey yearf attended juku in the late years of elementary school, 1; otherwise, 0.
Juku 3a Initial survey yearf attended juku when in junior high school, 1; otherwise, 0.
Juku 4a Initial survey yearf attended juku when in high school, 1; otherwise, 0.
City Sizea Initial survey yearf Size of cities of residence
Large City 14 major Japanese cities, 1; otherwise, 0.
Medium City cities other than \Large city," 1; otherwise, 0.
Other \Town, villages, or overseas" 1; otherwise, 0.
Number of Professorsb,h Age of seventeen Number of Professors per high school graduate
Spouse Availabilityb,h Age of seventeen For the respondents who did not have a university degree: the ratio
of (two-year senior) male high school graduates to female high school
graduates who did not go to university. For the respondents who have
a university degree: the ratio of (two-year senior) male high school
graduates who went to university to female high school graduates who
went to university.
Vacancy/ApplicationED
c,h Age of seventeen Ratio of job oers to job seekers
Vacancy/ApplicationMA
c,h Age at which educa-
tion is completedg
Ratio of job oers to job seekers
Univ./HS First Wage Ratiod Age of seventeen Ratio of University graduate's rst wage to high school graduate's rst
wage for males (national average)
Rente,h Age at which educa-
tion is completedg
Real rent per tatami mat, in thousands of yen (a tatami mat is approx-
imately 1.7 square meters).
a Source: JPSC
b Source: Basic School Survey (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology)
c Source: Job/Employment Placement Services Statistics (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare)
d Source: Basic Survey on Wage Structure (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare)
e Source: Housing and Land Survey of Japan (Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Aairs and Communications)
f We use the rst three waves of the JPSC. The initial survey year is 1993 for Wave A, 1997 for Wave B, 2003 for Wave C,
and 2008 for Wave D.
g The age at which education is completed is assumed to be 18 for high school graduates, 21 for junior college or vocational
school graduates, and 23 for university graduates.
h A not-JPSC variable which is aggregated at prefecture level.
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resided as of age 17.
The variables in xe are similar to those in Edwards and Pasquale (2003) and include:
characteristics of the woman's family background (parents' educational attainment, family
income, whether the young woman attended private high school, her number of siblings,
whether she has any brothers, and whether her mother was primarily a homemaker); proxy
measures of her academic ability (attendance at juku (\cram school") in elementary (Juku
2), junior high (Juku 3), and high school (Juku 4)); proxy measures for the availability and
opportunity costs of university education in her area as measured at her age 17 (the ratio
of professors to high school graduates and the vacancy/application ratio); a proxy for the
expected returns to university education (the ratio for males of the national average starting
wage for university graduates relative to that of high school graduates); and a dummy
variable indicating whether the EEOA was in eect when she was 17 years old, the age at
which we assume her nal decision with regard to university education is made. As discussed
earlier, the latter variable is included because the EEOA aimed to increase women's access
to career employment (and the resulting higher lifetime earnings), and university education
is the traditional route to this type of employment.
In the case of the marriage equation, the explanatory variables xm represent factors
suggested by the economic and demographic literature surveyed in the previous section. Ed-
ucational attainment has been found to be an important variable in marriage decisions in
almost all of the literature that we surveyed and falls directly out of the L&M utility max-
imization model described above; our education dummy variable indicates whether or not
the young woman completed university. Family background variables like parents' income,
family structure (number of siblings and whether there is a male sibling), and whether the
woman's mother was a full-time homemaker are also commonly used. To represent the state
of the labor market around the time that the young woman completes her education a variety
of proxies have been used (see Higuchi, 2001; Hashimoto and Kondo, 2012; Sakamoto and
Kitamura, 2007). We use the prefecture vacancy/application ratio at the age she completes
her schooling to proxy the strength of the labor market she faces post-schooling.19 A higher
vacancy/application ratio indicates a stronger job market, which may be positively or nega-
tively related to the probability of marriage.20 In addition, following Abe (2013), we include
19 The age at which a woman's education is completed is assumed to be 18 for a high school graduate, 21
for a junior college or vocational school graduate, and 23 for a university graduate.
20 Miyoshi (2014) and others, noting that a strong labor market aects both a woman's expected earning
power and the earning power of a potential spouse, refers to the positive relationship the \self-reliance eect"
and the negative relationship the \good catch eect."
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two city size variables to proxy the state of the labor market for university-educated women.
To capture the state of the marriage market we use several variables. The availability
of potential spouses with a level of education equal to that of the woman's (found to be an
important factor by Raymo and Iwasawa, 2005) is computed for each birth cohort for each
prefecture as follows: for women who did not have a university degree, we use the ratio of
the number of (two years older) male high school graduates (with or without a university
education) to female high school graduates (without a university education); for women who
had a university degree, we use the ratio of the number of (two years older) male university
graduates to female university graduates.21 We expect this variable to be positively related
to the woman's probability of marriage. The cost of setting up a household is proxied by
rent per tatami mat (in constant yen) in the woman's prefecture as of the year she completes
her education. The search costs associated with nding a mate and also varying cultural
norms regarding marriage are proxied by the two city size variables mentioned above (Sakai,
2009).
To explore the potential impact of the EEOA, we include in the marriage equation the
EEOA dummy variable as dened above as well as an EEOA/education interaction term.
This interaction term, which enables us to estimate separate education coecients for pre-
and post-EEOA cohorts, permits us to test the hypothesis that the passage of the EEOA
increased the \deterrent" eect of university education on marriage.
In addition to these variables we include in both the education and marriage equations
a set of dummy variables that indicate the geographic district in which the woman lived
when she was aged 17 (Japan is divided into ten such districts).22 These are included to
hold constant any district-specic unmeasured taste, economic, or cultural factors that may
aect education or marriage decisions. Finally, in some specications, we include a linear
time trend variable. Descriptive statistics for all variables are shown in Table 2. The nal
two columns of the table indicate whether the variable appears in the education equation,
the marriage equation, or both. The variables in the education equation (1) but not in
the marriage equation (2), that is, \Yes" to the rst of these two columns but \No" to the
21 We construct our proxy measure for spouse availability using men two years older than the women
because the average age dierence between spouses over the period of our study ranged from 2.9 years in
1987, to 2.6 in 1992, to 2.4 in 1997, to 1.7 in 2002, to 1.7 in 2005 (see National Institute of Population and
Social Security Research, 2005).
22 It is possible that women will not be living in the same district at the time they make their marriage
decision as when they were age 17, but the JPSC data do not permit us to identify the district in which
each woman lives subsequent to age 17. The ten districts (called Chiho in Japanese) are Hokkaido, Tohoku,
Minami-Kanto, Kita-Kanto&Koshin, Hokuriku, Tokai, Kinki, Chugoku, Shikoku and Kyushu.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Educ. Eq. Marr. Eq.
Marriage 0.8401 0.3666 0 1 No Yes
Completed Education 0.1690 0.3748 0 1 Yes Yes
EEOA 0.5789 0.4938 0 1 Yes Yes
Large City 0.2587 0.4380 0 1 No Yes
Middle City 0.5712 0.4950 0 1 No Yes
Rent 2.2323 0.9384 0.97 4.78 No Yes
Spouse availability 1.4686 0.4620 0.44 2.78 No Yes
Vacancy/applicationMA 0.8464 0.4338 0.12 2.68 No Yes
Middle Income Class 0.5350 0.4989 0 1 Yes Yes
High Income Class 0.1613 0.3679 0 1 Yes Yes
Mother's Education 0.0400 0.1961 0 1 Yes No
Father's Education 0.1790 0.3834 0 1 Yes No
Private High 0.3045 0.4603 0 1 Yes No
Homemaker 0.3299 0.4703 0 1 Yes Yes
Number of Siblings 2.4707 0.9144 1 12 Yes Yes
Having Brother(s) 0.5804 0.4936 0 1 Yes Yes
Juku 2 0.3714 0.4833 0 1 Yes No
Juku 3 0.5889 0.4921 0 1 Yes No
Juku 4 0.1821 0.3860 0 1 Yes No
Number of Professors 224.7074 93.9015 12 767 Yes No
Vacancy/applicationED 0.8751 0.4390 0.09 2.68 Yes No
Univ./HS rst wage ratio 1.2361 0.0365 1.15 1.42 Yes No
Number of obs. 2598
second, serve as the exclusion restrictions in our estimation.
5 Results
Table 3 presents maximum likelihood estimates of our model. In discussing these estimates,
we concentrate on the sign and signicance of the coecients and on comparing the two
specications. We do not discuss the magnitude of the probit coecients because they are
not readily interpretable. To evaluate magnitudes requires the estimation of partial eects,
which appear in Table 4.
Note that the education equation is estimated using our entire sample of 2598 observa-
tions, while the marriage equation uses the 2157 observations for which marriage data are
reported. That is, the observations without marriage information contribute to the likeli-
hood function of education only. The main dierence between these two samples is that
those who do not report marital status are more likely to be from recent cohorts and more
likely to be university graduates. Sakamoto (2006) nds that attrition in JPSC causes biases
17
Table 3: Estimation Results: Bivariate Probit Model of Completed Education and
Marital Status
Panel A Panel B
Base Model Counterfactual Model{
Trend Included
Coef. ( S.E.a ) Coef. ( S.E.a )
Education Equationb
EEOA 0.1561 ** ( 0.0792 ) -0.0012 ( 0.1301 )
Trend 0.0154 ( 0.0104 )
Middle Income 0.2157 *** ( 0.0791 ) 0.2171 *** ( 0.0791 )
High Income 0.4885 *** ( 0.0985 ) 0.4874 *** ( 0.0984 )
Mother Education 0.8781 *** ( 0.1472 ) 0.8710 *** ( 0.1475 )
Father Education 0.7274 *** ( 0.0800 ) 0.7225 *** ( 0.0802 )
Private High -0.1451 ** ( 0.0721 ) -0.1459 ** ( 0.0721 )
Homemaker 0.1493 ** ( 0.0697 ) 0.1571 ** ( 0.0700 )
Number of Siblings -0.1254 *** ( 0.0453 ) -0.1257 *** ( 0.0453 )
Having Brother(s) -0.0973 ( 0.0722 ) -0.0961 ( 0.0722 )
Juku 2 -0.0627 ( 0.0702 ) -0.0636 ( 0.0702 )
Juku 3 -0.1992 *** ( 0.0728 ) -0.2109 *** ( 0.0728 )
Juku 4 0.7476 *** ( 0.0787 ) 0.7510 *** ( 0.0786 )
Number of Professors -0.0003 ( 0.0004 ) -0.0002 ( 0.0004 )
Vacancy/ApplicationED -0.1596 ( 0.0998 ) -0.1433 ( 0.0999 )
Univ./HS First Wage Ratio 0.3796 ( 1.2423 ) 0.1828 ( 1.2485 )
constant -1.8857 ( 1.5602 ) -1.7440 ( 1.5649 )
Marriage Equationb
Completed Education -0.3238 ( 0.2808 ) -0.2760 ( 0.2860 )
EEOA 0.0802 ( 0.1004 ) 0.1678 ( 0.1456 )
Education  EEOA -0.3556 * ( 0.1898 ) -0.3376 * ( 0.1917 )
Trend -0.0117 ( 0.0129 )
Middle Income Class -0.0130 ( 0.0773 ) -0.0111 ( 0.0773 )
High Income Class -0.0495 ( 0.1163 ) -0.0507 ( 0.1159 )
Homemaker -0.0806 ( 0.0728 ) -0.0846 ( 0.0729 )
Number of Siblings 0.1662 *** ( 0.0470 ) 0.1668 *** ( 0.0471 )
Having Brother(s) -0.1430 ** ( 0.0727 ) -0.1443 ** ( 0.0728 )
Large City -0.2177 * ( 0.1148 ) -0.2206 * ( 0.1146 )
Middle City -0.1770 * ( 0.1005 ) -0.1769 * ( 0.1004 )
Rent -0.1782 ** ( 0.0803 ) -0.1662 ** ( 0.0816 )
Spouse Availability -0.1354 ( 0.1462 ) -0.0728 ( 0.1674 )
Vacancy/ApplicationMA -0.3272 *** ( 0.1005 ) -0.3348 *** ( 0.1011 )
constant 1.4021 *** ( 0.2849 ) 1.3793 *** ( 0.2891 )
 0.0078 ( 0.1318 ) 0.0074 ( 0.1306 )
N of obs. 2,598 2,598
Log Likelihood -1840.5758 -1839.1309
a White (1982)-type robust standard errors. *, **, *** indicate statistical signicance at 10%,
5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
b Both education and marriage equations also contain the district dummy variables.
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in the estimation of the marriage decision function. Especially, he nds that the eect of
the rst job is likely to be underestimated in the marriage equation. It is unclear, however,
whether or how these missing observations for the marriage equation would lead to biased
estimates of our model. A potential selection bias is one of limitations in our study.
We begin with the estimates in column 1, which pertain to our base model. For the uni-
versity education equation, shown in the top half of the table, our results are consistent with
our expectations and with Edwards and Pasquale (2003).23 Consider rst our main variable
of interest, the EEOA dummy. This variable has a positive and statistically signicant sign,
indicating that young women who made their higher education decisions after the passage
of the EEO Act were more likely than comparable women from earlier cohorts to have a
university degree.
Among the other variables, characteristics of the young woman and her family are very
important for predicting whether or not she has a university degree: higher family income,
greater parental education, and fewer siblings are all positive and signicant predictors of the
probability that a young woman has a university education. Having a mother who was a full
time homemaker is also positively and signicantly related to a young woman's likelihood of
having a university education|perhaps having one's mother available full time facilitates the
young woman's study. Greater academic ability, as reected by three juku (\cram school")
variables, is also associated with a higher probability of having university degree (attending
juku in elementary and/or junior high school are indicators of a lower than average level of
ability, and attending juku in high school is an indicator that the young woman has a high
enough level of ability to contemplate university).24 Attending a private high school, which
has a statistically signicant negative sign, may also be reecting academic ability: outside
of metropolitan areas, private high schools are of lower quality than public high schools and
this dierences may translate to lower student academic ability.
The three variables included to capture the returns to and costs and availability of uni-
versity education do not have statistically signicant coecients. These variables|the va-
cancy/application ratio, the professor/high school graduate ratio, and the ratio of the start-
ing wage for male university graduates to the starting wage for male high school graduates|
are all measured at the prefecture or national level and may not well represent the underlying
23 Note that Edwards and Pasquale (2003) is not perfectly comparable with this paper because it employs
three education categories (university, junior college, and all other education) and a logit econometric model.
24 See Edwards and Pasquale (2003) for a more detailed discussion of using attendance at juku as a proxy
for ability. Note that it is possible that there is reverse causality with regard to the Juku 4 variable if young
women who plan to pursue a university education are more likely than others to attend juku in their high
school years.
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costs and returns factors faced by the young women in our sample.
Estimates of the marriage equation appear in the bottom half of Table 3. We focus rst
on the roles of the two variables of primary interest|the young woman's education and
EEOA|and on the interaction between them. At rst glance, both variables do not make
a signicant contribution to the marriage decision: the university education variable has a
negative coecient, as expected, but it is not statistically signicant, and the EEOA variable
has an unexpected positive coecient, but is also not statistically signicant. However, when
we look at the coecient of the education/EEOA interaction term, which is negative and
statistically signicant, a pattern emerges. For pre-EEOA cohorts, there is a negative rela-
tionship between university education and marriage by age 32, but it is not strong enough
to rise to statistical signicance. For post-EEOA cohorts this negative eect, represented by
the sum of the education coecient and the interaction coecient, reaches statistical signif-
icance. To be specic, the education coecient for pre-EEOA cohorts is a non-signicant
-.324, while for post-EEOA cohorts it is more than twice as large, at -.680 (-.324 + (-.356
)), and a Wald test indicates that this sum is statistically signicant, with the p-value of
0.0156. This result is consistent with our hypothesis that the \deterrent eect" of univer-
sity education on marriage would increase after the passage of the EEOA. Interestingly, the
EEOA dummy variable itself is not statistically signicant, indicating that the EEOA had
no added eect on marriage beyond that which operates through university education.
The role of family background variables is mixed. Higher family income is associated
with a lower probability of marriage, as is having a mother who is a full-time homemaker,
but these are not statistically signicant relationships. In contrast, having more siblings has
a signicant positive relationship to the probability of marriage, while having at least one
brother has a signicant negative relationship with the probability of marriage. Having more
siblings may reduce a young woman's responsibilities with regard to caring for aged parents,
thereby making it more feasible for her to marry. Similarly, having at least one brother,
holding constant the number of siblings, means that she has fewer sisters available to help
care for aging parents, and therefore may be less likely to marry by age 32.
Other variables in the marriage equation are proxies for aspects of the marriage market
and/or the labor market. The two city size variables|large city and medium city|reect
unmeasured aspects of both the labor market and the marriage market. The signs of both
variables are negative and signicant, with the coecient of \large city" greater in absolute
value than the coecient of \medium city". This result implies that the larger the city in
which a woman lives the less likely she is to have married by age 32, a result consistent
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with the ndings in Sakai (2009). Rental costs are also signicantly related to the likelihood
of marriage and in the expected direction, with higher rental costs associated with a lower
probability of marriage. The other measure that proxies the state of the marriage market,
spouse availability, is not statistically signicant and its sign is the opposite what we ex-
pected, possibly because of the imprecision of this measure. The vacancy/application ratio,
included to capture the state of the labor market, has a negative, statistically signicant
sign, consistent with the ndings of Higuchi (2001) that women are less likely to marry when
the job market is strong.
Two other ndings in Table 3 should be pointed out. First, the estimated value for the
coecient of correlation between the error terms in the education and marriage equations
is positive but small (.0078) and not statistically signicant. This means that the potential
correlation between unmeasured characteristics of the young woman that aect both edu-
cation and marriage is not large enough to aect our estimates. Second, more than half
of the district dummy variables (not shown) are statistically signicant, indicating that it
is important to include these variables to hold constant cross-sectional social and economic
dierences that are not fully captured by the socioeconomic variables included in the analysis.
We explore one variation in our model. A skeptic could argue that the results in column
1 with regard to the relationships among the marriage, education, and EEOA variables are
simply reecting secular trends in cultural attitudes towards the role of women in society
rather than any \cause and eect" relationship among these three variables. Put dier-
ently, one could conjecture that the EEOA variable in both equations and the education
and education/EEOA interaction variables in the marriage equation are simply proxies for
omitted variables that capture secular changes in attitudes.25 If this argument were true, a
trend variable added to our estimating equations would be statistically signicant and knock
out some or all of the other variables that have monotonic trends. Even it were not valid,
the potential multicollinearity among the variables with common trends has the potential
to raise the standard errors of coecient estimates, reducing their likelihood of statistical
signicance.
We carry out this demanding robustness test by adding a trend variable to our base
specications in column 1. This variable (\Trend") is coded at one for the oldest cohort
25 An alternative way of casting this argument is to say that the EEOA is an endogenous variable, a result
of these changing attitudes. While changing attitudes within Japan undoubtedly played a role, this is a case
where exogenous forces were at work: it was widely recognized at the time the Act was under discussion that
Japan felt some pressure, as a signatory of the 1980 United Nations Convention Concerning the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, to pass legislation that would put it into compliance with
this Convention.
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in our data (those born in 1959) up to 21 for the youngest cohort (born in 1979). The
resulting estimates appear in column 2 of Table 3. As might be expected, the coecient
of Trend has a positive sign in the education equation and a negative sign in the marriage
equation. However, in both cases the coecients are not statistically signicantly dierent
from zero. Thus, adding this variable does not contribute signicant explanatory power to
our economic model. What including this collinear variable does do, however, is to sap some
strength from the EEOA variable in the education equation. Specically, the coecient of the
EEOA variable in the education equation drops to virtually zero, its standard error almost
doubles, and it loses statistical signicance, thereby casting doubt on the role the EEOA
played in university education decisions. In contrast, in the marriage equation, including
the trend variable leads to no changes in our conclusions. Notably, the coecient of the
education/EEOA interaction in the marriage equation maintains its statistically signicant
negative sign (though its coecient shrinks slightly in absolute value). In sum, the result
of this robustness test is to conrm our ndings with regard to the role of the EEOA and
education in the marriage decision, but to create skepticism about our previous nding of a
signicant positive eect of the EEOA on university education decisions.26
6 Further Results: Partial Eects
26 We perform a second robustness test in response to a reviewer's recommendation. Recall that our
specication of the cohorts to be aected by the EEOA includes young women who were age 17 or younger
when the Act was passed in 1985|because post-high-school education plans would already have been made
for women aged 18 or older at that time. The reviewer suggested, however, that women who were aged 18-21
in 1985 might have been able to alter their post-high-school education plans upon learning of the passage
of the Act, and suggested that as a \robustness test" we also estimate a version of our model that includes
these four age-cohorts in the post-EEOA group rather than in the pre-EEOA group. We conduct this test,
re-computing the estimates in Table 3 using a revised denition of the EEOA dummy variable to reect
the recommended changes. Given that the four cohorts added to the post-EEOA group are less likely to
have been aected by the passage of the Act, we expected the coecients of the revised EEOA variable
(denoted EEOA-rev) in the education and marriage equations to decline in absolute value and this is what
we nd for the most part. For example, in our base case (i.e., without the trend variable) in the education
equation, the coecient of EEOA is a statistically signicant .1561, whereas for EEOA-rev, the coecient
falls to a non-signicant .0886. Similarly, for the marriage equation, the coecient of the EEOA/education
interaction term is a statistically signicant -.3556, whereas for the EEOA-rev/education interaction term, it
is a non-signicant -.1085. The one exception to this pattern is in the marriage equation, where the EEOA
dummy is a non-signicant .0802, but the EEOA-rev dummy is a statistically signicant -.2760, implying
that there is a predicted reduction in marriage probability for the post-EEOA cohorts. To summarize, the
expansion in the denition of post-EEOA cohorts results in an estimated weaker eect of the EEO Act
on women's choice of university education, but the nding of lower predicted marriage rates by age 32 for
post-EEOA cohorts remains, though through a dierent mechanism.
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Table 4: Partial Eects on Education and Marriage Decisions
Direct Eect Indirect Eect Total Eect
Est. ( S.E.a) Est. ( S.E.a) Est. ( S.E.a)
Panel A: Base Model
Education Decision
EEOA 0.031 ** ( 0.014 )
Middle Income 0.040 *** ( 0.012 )
High Income 0.103 *** ( 0.022 )
Mother's Education 0.239 *** ( 0.049 )
Father's Education 0.183 *** ( 0.023 )
Private High -0.028 ** ( 0.015 )
Homemaker 0.030 ** ( 0.014 )
Number of Siblings -0.025 *** ( 0.010 )
Juku 3 -0.040 ** ( 0.017 )
Juku 4 0.186 *** ( 0.023 )
Marriage Decision
Completed Education -0.150 * ( 0.084 )
pre-EEOA -0.085 ( 0.087 )
pro-EEOA -0.191 ** ( 0.092 )
EEOA 0.006 ( 0.024 ) -0.005 * ( 0.003 ) 0.001 ( 0.024 )
Middle Income Class -0.003 ( 0.017 ) -0.006 * ( 0.004 ) -0.009 ( 0.017 )
High Income Class -0.012 ( 0.029 ) -0.016 * ( 0.009 ) -0.028 ( 0.027 )
Homemaker -0.019 ( 0.018 ) -0.005 * ( 0.003 ) -0.024 ( 0.017 )
Number of Siblings 0.039 *** ( 0.010 ) 0.004 ( 0.003 ) 0.043 *** ( 0.010 )
Having Brother(s) -0.033 ** ( 0.016 ) 0.003 ( 0.003 ) -0.030 * ( 0.016 )
Large City -0.049 * ( 0.029 )
Middle City -0.039 * ( 0.023 )
Rent -0.042 ** ( 0.019 )
Vacancy/ApplicationMA -0.077 *** ( 0.025 )
Mother's Education -0.037 * ( 0.019 )
Father's Education -0.028 * ( 0.015 )
Juku 3 0.006 ( 0.005 )
Juku 4 -0.029 * ( 0.016 )
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Table 4: Partial Eects on Education and Marriage Decisions
Direct Eect Indirect Eect Total Eect
Est. ( S.E.a) Est. ( S.E.a) Est. ( S.E.a)
Panel B: Counterfactual Model-Trend Included
Education Decision
EEOA 0.000 ( 0.025 )
Middle Income 0.040 *** ( 0.012 )
High Income 0.102 *** ( 0.022 )
Mother's Education 0.236 *** ( 0.048 )
Father's Education 0.181 *** ( 0.023 )
Private High -0.028 * ( 0.015 )
Homemaker 0.032 ** ( 0.014 )
Number of Siblings -0.025 ** ( 0.010 )
Juku 3 -0.043 ** ( 0.017 )
Juku 4 0.187 *** ( 0.023 )
Marriage Decision
Completed Education -0.132 ( 0.084 )
pre-EEOA -0.074 ( 0.088 )
pro-EEOA -0.165 * ( 0.092 )
EEOA 0.028 ( 0.037 ) 0.000 ( 0.004 ) 0.028 ( 0.037 )
Middle Income Class -0.003 ( 0.017 ) -0.006 ( 0.004 ) -0.008 ( 0.017 )
High Income Class -0.012 ( 0.029 ) -0.014 ( 0.009 ) -0.026 ( 0.027 )
Homemaker -0.020 ( 0.040 ) -0.005 ( 0.003 ) -0.025 ( 0.017 )
Number of Siblings 0.039 *** ( 0.010 ) 0.004 ( 0.002 ) 0.043 *** ( 0.010 )
Having Brother(s) -0.034 ** ( 0.016 ) 0.003 ( 0.003 ) -0.031 ** ( 0.016 )
Large City -0.050 * ( 0.029 )
Middle City -0.039 * ( 0.023 )
Rent -0.039 ** ( 0.019 )
Vacancy/ApplicationMA -0.079 *** ( 0.025 )
Mother's Education -0.032 * ( 0.019 )
Father's Education -0.025 ( 0.015 )
Juku 3 0.006 ( 0.005 )
Juku 4 -0.026 ( 0.016 )
a Bootstrap standard errors with 100 replications. *, **, *** indicate statistical
signicance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
We have identied the statistically signicant variables that inuence the university educa-
tion and marriage decisions of young women, but it is well known that statistical signicance
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does not necessarily translate into practical economic or social impact. To see which vari-
ables would be of meaningful consequence to decision making, we compute partial eects.
These partial eects are shown in Table 4 and are computed as described below.
The partial eects on the education decision can be computed in the same way as those
in a usual probit model since E(Ei) = (eAi + xe;i
0e). Because of its recursive structure,
there is no impact of xm;i on the education decision. Only the variables xe;i directly aect the
education decision. For discrete variables such as Ai, we compute the partial eects using
the nite-dierence method: E(Eijxe;i = 1)   E(Eijxe;i = 0). For continuous variables, we
compute the partial eects using the calculus method: @E(Ei)=@xe;i.
Computing partial eects in the marriage equation is more complicated. Consider rst
one of our main interests: the impact of the education on the marriage decision. This can
be computed as
E(MijEi = 1)  E(MijEi = 0) = ( + ( + m)Ai + xm;i0m)  (mAi + xm;i0m); (3)
where the expectations are conditional on the other explanatory variables as well (suppressed
for brevity). In the literature, this eect is often referred to as the average treatment eect.
We estimate this eect by evaluating equation (3) for each observation and then taking
the average. We also estimate the partial eect of education on marriage separately before
and after the EEOA. Specically, the pre-EEOA education eect is computed by evaluating
equation (3) with Ai = 0 for each observation. Likewise, we compute the post-EEOA
education eect by assigning Ai = 1 for each observation.
The other explanatory variables can have direct and indirect impacts on the marriage
decision, depending on whether a variable appears in the marriage equation or the education
equation. Direct partial eects are the impacts on the marriage decision of the explanatory
variables that appear in the marriage equation (xm;i). The signs of the direct eect are the
same as the sign of the coecients in the marriage equation (2). Indirect partial eects are
the impacts on the marriage decision of explanatory variables that appear in the education
equation (xe;i) through the education decision. Given the negative impact of the education
on the marriage decision, the signs of the indirect partial eects are opposite to signs of
the coecients in the education equation. If a variable appears in both the marriage and
education equations, the sum of direct and indirect partial eects is reported as a total
eect.27
In general, we compute all of the partial eects described above by computing them for
27 Specically, under the assumption of the bivariate normality, the expected value of Mi (conditional on
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each observation and then averaging across all observations to yield average partial eects.
Standard errors are estimated using the bootstrap method with 100 replicates.
The partial eects reported in Table 4 correspond to the two specications in Table 3:
Panel A contains partial eects computed from the coecient estimates of our base model
in column 1 (trend variable excluded), while Panel B contains those computed from the
counterfactual model in column 2 (trend variable included). Partial eects are shown for our
main variables of interest and for those that are statistically signicant in Table 3. Recall
that partial eects are computed for each variable holding constant all other variables and
are therefore not additive.
To get a sense of the scale of these partial eects, it is useful to keep in mind the level
and changes in the prevalence of university education and marriage across the cohorts in our
sample. The percent of women in our sample with a university education ranged from 11%
in the earliest cohort to 25% in the nal cohort, an increase of 14 percentage points. Over
the same period, the percent of 32 year-olds ever married ranged from 100% in our earliest
cohort to 73% in the nal cohort, a decline of 27 percentage points.
We begin our discussion of Table 4 with the variables that are the prime focus of this
research: EEOA in the education equation and both EEOA and education in the marriage
equation. In Panel A, the partial eect of EEOA on the probability of university education
exogenous explanatory variables) can be written as
E(Mi) = 2(mAi + xm;i
0m; eAi   xe;i0e; ) + 2( + ( + m)Ai + xm;i0m; eAi + xe;i0e; );
where 2(; ; ) is the cdf of the bivariate normal distribution with the coecient of correlation . For discrete
variables, we compute the partial eects using the nite-dierence method. We evaluate the expected value
E(Mi) at the relevant values of xm;i for the direct eect and xe;i for the indirect eect. For continuous
variables, we compute the partial eects using the calculus method by taking partial derivatives. The direct








 eA  xe;i0e + (mAi + xm0m)p
1  2
!
+ ( + ( + m)Ai + xm;i
0m) 
 












 + ( + m)Ai + xm;i










See Greene (1998) and Hasebe (2013) for details of partial eects in the bivariate probit model.
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is a statistically signicant 3 percentage points. While this is not large relative to the partial
eects of family background variables, it does amount to about 20% of the total increase
in the proportion of women with a university education over the time period studied. In
contrast, in Panel B, which shows the results of our robustness test (i.e. trend variable
included), the partial eect of EEOA falls to virtually zero. It is hard to know which is the
more reliable estimate. The conservative approach is to recognize this uncertainty explicitly
and conclude that the best point estimate of the partial eect is in the range of 0 to 3
percentage points. Put dierently, we cannot draw an unambiguous conclusion about the
importance of the EEO Act on young women's decisions with regard to university education.
In the case of the marriage equation, the partial eect of the EEOA variable is not
signicantly dierent from zero in Panel A or B. Conversely, the university education variable
has a large partial eect|a negative and signicant 15 percentage points in Panel A and
a negative but non-signicant 13 percentage points in Panel B. However, these estimated
partial eects, which are in eect an average over pre-EEOA and post-EEOA cohorts, obscure
a crucial nding: it is the interaction between the EEOA and education that is the real story
here. The deterrent eect of university education on marriage is more than doubled after the
passage of the EEOA. To be specic, prior to the EEOA, a university education is associated
with an 8.5 (7.4 in Panel B) percentage point reduction in the likelihood that a young
woman has married by age 32, though this partial eect is not statistically dierent from
zero. Subsequent to the EEOA, however, the partial eect is much larger and statistically
signicant, yielding a 19 percentage point reduction in the probability of marriage (.17 in
Panel B). Given the fact that in our sample the proportion of 32-year-olds who have married
falls by 27 percentage points over the period in our study, the magnitude of this partial
eect for post-EEOA cohorts is remarkable. This result clearly supports the proposition
that university-educated women believe that they can best take advantage of the enhanced
career options associated with the passage of the EEO Act by delaying or declining marriage.
Partial eects of the other variables in the education and marriage equations, though
not the main focus of our study, are also informative. Consistent with the probit estimates
in Table 3, the rst thing to point out is that except for the variables discussed above,
the magnitudes of partial eects are very close in Panels A and B. Therefore, we limit our
discussion to the results for our base model, in Panel A.
In the case of the education equation, it is evident in Table 4 that family background
variables play the strongest role in decisions regarding university education. The partial eect
of mother's education is by far the largest: having a mother with a university education is
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associated with an increased probability that a young woman herself completes university
by 24 percentage points. Having a father with a university education is almost as powerful,
associated with a 18 percentage point increased likelihood of completing university, as is
attending juku in high school, which is associated with a 19 percentage point increase in the
likelihood of completing university. Being in a high income category is also associated with
a large partial eect, as compared to being in the lowest income category, at 10 percentage
points. Other family background variables that are statistically signicant have lesser partial
eects ranging from 2 to 4 percentage points.
In the case of the marriage equation, both direct and indirect partial eects must be
considered. Among the direct eects the single most important variable, in terms of the
magnitude of the partial eect, is whether or not the young woman has a university edu-
cation, as discussed in detail above. The other statistically signicant direct partial eects
are smaller. Women from large cities are 5 percentage points less likely to be married as
compared to small cities, and the corresponding dierence is 4 percentage points for middle-
sized cities versus small cities. The number and gender of siblings have an impact of similar
magnitude: having an additional sibling is associated with about a 4 percentage point in-
crease in the probability of marriage, while having at least one brother is associated with
a 3 percentage point decline. The partial eects of the rent and labor market variables are
also comparable in magnitude: a one standard deviation increase in monthly rent (which
corresponds approximately to a one thousand yen increase) is associated with about a 4
percentage point decline in the likelihood of marriage, and a one standard deviation increase
in the vacancy/application ratio (which we see from Table 2 is 0.439) is associated with a
decline of about 3 percentage points (:439 ( 0:0787)).
Beyond these direct eects, a number of variables have signicant indirect eects on
marriage through their eects on education. In the case of variables that are common to
both the marriage and education equations, taking into account these indirect eects does not
substantially change the conclusions drawn above. That is, the combined direct and indirect
eects of these variables, shown in the \total" column in Table 4, do not dier substantively
from the direct eects alone, so we do not discuss them further. However in the case of several
of the variables that appear only in the education equation, the indirect partial eects on
marriage merit mention. Most notable is the mother's education variable: women whose
mothers were themselves university graduates have a 3.7 percentage point lower probability
of marriage by 32, as compared to other women. Slightly smaller statistically signicant
indirect partial eects are also reported for father's education and Juku 4 (though these do
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not maintain statistical signicance in Panel B).
7 Conclusions
Prompted by declines in Japanese birth rates and marriage rates over the past thirty years,
this paper seeks to understand how women's declining propensity to marry interacts with
the growth over the same period in women's propensity to attend university, and how both of
these latter two trends may have been impacted by the passage in 1985 of the Japanese Equal
Employment Opportunity Act (EEOA). Using data from a unique Japanese panel survey,
the Japanese Panel Survey on Consumers (JPSC), we estimate a model that treats education
and marriage decisions as jointly, though not simultaneously, determined. Specically, we
use a recursive bivariate probit econometric model to capture the particular context within
which education and marriage decisions are made in Japan.
What are our conclusions? First, a young woman's decision with regard to university
education is determined primarily by her parents' education and income, by the young
woman's ability, and by her family's structure. Economic factors that reect the costs and
returns to education do not play a signicant role in this analysis. The role of the EEOA is
unclear: with point estimates of the partial eect ranging from 0 to 3 percentage points, our
results are suggestive but inconclusive.
Second, it is clear that young women's decisions with regard to university education and
marriage are closely interlinked. The single most important variable from among those we
study in determining whether a woman is married by age 32 is whether or not she has a
university education. Notably, this strong linkage is found only for post-EEOA cohorts.
Specically, for pre-EEOA cohorts, university-educated women are estimated to be 7 to 8
percentage points less likely to married by age 32, compared to their less-educated con-
temporaries, but this estimate is not statistically signicant. In contrast, for post-EEOA
cohorts, we see a strikingly large, statistically signicant negative partial eect of university
education on marriage by age 32, with point estimates from -16 to -19 percentage points.
There is also an intergenerational aspect to the role of education in marriage which operates
indirectly, with women whose mothers or fathers had a university education approximately
3 percentage points less likely to be married by age 32.
Third, other factors aect marriage decisions by age 32, but to a lesser extent. Marriage
is less likely for women who live in large or middle-sized cities or who have a male sibling. In
contrast, having additional siblings (holding their sex constant) is associated with a higher
likelihood of marriage. The role of the labor market is similar to that reported by other
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researchers: when the vacancy/application rate is higher, and jobs more plentiful, women
are less likely to be married by age 32. Also, when the cost of setting up a marital home, as
reected by average rental costs, is higher, women are less likely to be married by that age.
The passage of the EEOA does not appear to have had an important impact in of itself,
but rather operates by increasing the responsiveness of the marriage decision to university
education, as described above.
At the beginning of this paper, we set out three hypotheses: (1) The passage of the EEOA,
by expanding career opportunities of university educated women, increased the proportion
of qualied women who follow this educational path; (2) The expanded career opportunities
associated with university education inuence women's marriage decisions, leading them
to delay or decline marriage; (3) The passage of the EEOA (and subsequent supporting
legislation), which changed the legal and cultural landscape to make a career path more
socially and economically attractive to women, increased the \deterrent" eect of university
education on marriage. In the case of our rst hypothesis, our evidence about the role of
the EEOA in university-education decisions does not provide unambiguous support. It may
be that some young women chose other paths not studied here, like vocational training, as
avenue for taking advantage of the opportunities aording by the EEOA. In the case of the
second and third hypotheses, we nd that women who were university educated had a lower
probability of being married by the age of thirty-two, as compared to other similar women,
and that, most notably, the deterrent eect of university education is signicantly greater for
post-EEOA cohorts than for their predecessors. Overall, our research strongly suggests that
the Japanese Equal Employment Opportunity Act and the expansion in career opportunities
it made available to university-educated women was a contributory factor in the delay and
decline over the past 30 years of marriage in Japan.
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